Myths
are "hangups from way back":[1] false or highly inaccurate beliefs
that are taken at face value. One collection of myths which has exercised a powerful
grip on the minds of many, and contributed to feelings of inferiority on the
part of large numbers of "pure" or "mixed" descendants of
Native Americans in the region of northern Mesoamerica,2 has to do with the
conquest of the "Aztec Empire" by HernanCortes and his followers in
the early sixteenth century. This paper attempts to shatter one of these myths;
namely, that Cortes was an extraordinarily brave and intelligent individual who
accomplished an almost miraculous feat. It will do so by making use of the twin
concepts of virtu and fortuna.
These
two terms are basic to Niccolo Machiavelli's thought. For this (in)famous
political theorist, the "wheel of fortune" is an ever-present
phenomenon in human affairs--- even though its effects can be controlled via
the application of what he calls virtu. It is difficult to specify the meaning
of this word, as it encompasses a wide range of qualities (including bravery,
cunning and prudence) that need to be handled with great flexibility in order
for a person or social group to be able to adapt to changing circumstances.[3]
The
Spanish conquistador HernanCortes is considered to be an outstanding example of
a man possessed of virtu.[4] My contention is that the latter's virtu was
insufficient for him to be able to control the effects of fortuna. Granted, Cortes
faced favorable circumstances on several occasions and took advantage of these.
However, at other times conditions were adverse and he was unable to surmount
them. In what follows, I analyze several events that occurred during and after
the so-called Conquest of Mexico in order to show that Cortes'
political achievements were more modest than is generally believed.[5]
During
his stay in the region of Totonacapan,[6] Cortes took two audacious decisions:
to destroy the majority of his ships in order to force his men to follow him;
and to embark on a march to Tenochtitlan, passing first through Tlaxcallan.
Both decisions were based on his ignorance of the actual power of the Triple
Alliance and the confederation of Tlaxcallan.[7]
Cortes
underestimated these two because of his early experiences in Mesoamerica.
Although they initially tried to avoid confrontations with the native
communities, the Spaniards had to engage in several battles against a coalition
of Maya armies near Potonchan (located in the present-day state of Tabasco).
However, they were able to win these battles thanks to the superiority of their
weapons and military tactics.
The
outcome of these skirmishes was quickly known! by the Triple Alliance. As a
result, when Cortes arrived in the region of Totonacapan, this alliance opted
in favor of a strategy of deterrence rather than war. Envoys sent by
Tenochtitlan established contact with Cortes and presented him with a series of
lavish gifts that were meant to indicate the might of the Triple Alliance.[8]
However, the strategy backfired because Cortes was unable to grasp
the symbolism of the gifts and interpreted them as a sign of weakness.
Moreover, the great quantity of gold given to the Spaniards made them all the
more determined to reach Tenochtitlan.
Unable
to persuade Cortes to withdraw, the Triple Alliance chose to
suspend talks. Shortly afterwards, representatives from nearby Cempohuallan
visited the Spaniards and complained about the tribute which their city-state
had to pay the Triple Alliance as a token of vassalage. Cortes
thus became aware of political divisions which could be used by him in order to
obtain allies. Thanks to a series of clever deceptions, he secured the
cooperation of Cempohuallan and other Totonac city-states, which provided
porters and soldiers for the journey to Tenochtitlan. The Totonacs also
suggested that he travel first to Tlaxcallan in order to enlist the support of
this bitter enemy of the Triple Alliance.
Fortune
smiled on Cortes while he was in Totonacapan. He obtained allies
and the Triple Alliance offered no resistance. What the conquistador did not
know, however, was that for climatological and logistical reasons--it was the
harvest season in Mesoamerica and most of the inhabitants of Tenochtitlan and
its allies were not available for a military campaign so far away from their home
base--the Triple Alliance was in no condition to display its full military
force in Totonacapan.9 Cortes was thus left with the impression
that no potential adversary in Mesoamerica was more powerful than the Maya
forces he had defeated in Potonchan or the Totonac city-states which had
reluctantly acquiesced in his destruction of some of their idols.
Cortes
was confident that he would be able to secure an alliance with Tlaxcallan.
However, the leaders of this confederation were unsure as to the real
intentions of the Spaniards since they were accompanied by Totonac warriors,
nominal vassals of the Triple Alliance. The Tlaxcallans therefore decided to
confront them. Several battles took place, in which the Spaniards successfully
defended themselves. Nevertheless, it quickly became apparent to Cortes
that Tlaxcallan possessed armed forces far superior to those which existed on
the Mesoamerican coast. The Spaniards now faced a predicament: if they
retreated to Totonacapan, this would show that they were not really so strong,
and it was probable that the Totonacs would become emboldened and attack them
with large forces; however, if the Spaniards stayed put and did not succeed in
forming an alliance with the Tlaxcallans, then the latter would eventually
crush them, thanks to their vast numerical superiority. Although many of his
men despaired, Cortes remained calm and continued sending peace
offers to the Tlaxcallans while at the same time engaging in minor military
offensives so as to make them believe that the Spaniards were formidable
warriors.
Fortune
soon smiled once again on Cortes. Although they still possessed
huge forces, the Tlaxcallans had suffered many casualties at the hands of the
Spaniards. This provoked dissension among their leaders, and one of them
decided to withdraw his troops, thus handicapping the confederation. The
Tlaxcallans also worried that fighting against Cort6s would greatly weaken
them, and so place them at a disadvantage in future confrontations with the
Triple Alliance. On the other hand, an alliance with the Spaniards might enable
them to deal more effectively with their traditional adversaries. Tlaxcallan
therefore agreed to negotiate with Cortes and shortly afterwards
a major coalition came into being. Although the Triple Alliance continued
trying to convince the Spaniards to withdraw, the latter soon appeared in the
Valley of Mexico and were cordially greeted by Moctezuma, the tlatoani or
political leader of Tenochtitlan.
A
few days after his arrival, Cortes imprisoned Moctezuma and,
although the latter continued to pose as the supreme authority, the former
established de facto control over Tenochtitlan. The conquistador also took
advantage of divisions among the city-states of the Valley of Mexico in order
to frustrate a planned attack on Tenochtitlan by its nominal ally, Texcoco.
For
several months Cortes seemed to meet with much success. However,
in March 1520 his luck began to change. The priesthood in Tenochtitlan became
openly hostile towards the Spaniards, and Moctezuma suddenly demanded that the
Spaniards leave his city-state. Cortes pretended to acquiesce,
but asked for time in order to rebuild his ships on the coast.
The
following month an expedition led by Panfilo de Narvaez arrived in Totonacapan
seeking to arrest Cortes for having disobeyed the governor of the
island of Cuba by sailing to Mesoamerica. Cortes left a small
group of his men in Tenochtitlan under the command of Pedro de Alvarado and
hurried to the coast in order to confront Narvaez. He not only managed to
defeat the latter but also convinced most of Narvaez' men to join him. During
his absence, however, the population of Tenochtitlan rose up in arms owing to a
massacre commited by Alvarado during a native religious festival which he took
to be the beginning of a planned offensive against the eighty Spaniards who had
remained in the city.
Cortes
returned to the Valley of Mexico with more than 1,300 Spaniards and over two
thousand Tlaxcallan warriors. Confident of regaining control, he decided to
enter Tenochtitlan. He realized his mistake when shortly afterwards he .and his
men were besieged in their quarters by tens of thousands of warriors. Cortes
now demanded that Moctezuma negotiate with his people but the latter claimed he
no longer had any political influence--although maybe his brother, Cuitlahuac,
a fellow prisoner, might be able to solve the problem. Cortes
therefore freed Cuitlahuac without realizing that this nobleman, who had always
opposed the idea of appeasing the Spaniards, would immediately become the
leader of Tenochtitlan.
Cortes'
only solution was to flee from the city. He managed to do so at the cost of
more than half of the Spaniards and Tlaxcallans who were with him. He was able
to cross the northern part of the Valley of Mexico and win a battle at Otompan
before reaching Tlaxcallan. He was also fortunate in that the Tlaxcallans
continued their alliance with him, that the Triple Alliance had to concentrate
on re-establishing its control over the Valley of Mexico and was thus unable to
launch an attack on Tlaxcallan, and that a few months after his escape, a
smallpox epidemic began to decimate the population of northern Mesoamerica
(something which created new political problems within the Triple Aliance and
its vassal states).
However,
Cortes' attempt to peacefully conquer Tenochtitlan and its
allies--a project which seemed to be working before March 1520--failed
completely.
Between
August and December 1520, Cortes was able to recover and to
extend his control over various city-states located in the Valley of Puebla,
thus guaranteeing his access to the coast of Totonacapan. During this time, the
Triple Alliance resorted to a defensive strategy since it did not possess
sufficient military resources to protect its allies beyond the Valley of
Mexico. Toward the end of 1520, the Spaniards and Tlaxcallans invaded the
valley. They quickly managed to dominate Texcoco and many neighboring
city-states. Then, in April 1521, Cortes embarked on the second
phase of his military campaign, which consisted in securing control of the
valley lakes and laying siege to Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco (both located on a
small island in Lake Texcoco). By this time, Cuitlahuac had died of smallpox
and a noble from Tlatelolco, Cuauhtemoc, had become the new tlatoani of
Tenochtitlan This leader was determined to fight to the bitter end against the
Spaniards and their allies.
Although
the inhabitants of Tenochtitlan offered great resistance to the invaders, the
latter so tightened their control over the lakes that famine broke out in
Tenochtitlan and Tlatelolco. Cortes made several attempts, all of
them unsuccessful, to negotiate a surrender with Cuauhtemoc. Faced with this
refusal, he determined to take the two cities even if it meant destroying them
in the process.
Tenochtitlan
fell in July 1521 and Tlatelolco one month later. Eyewitnesses such as the
soldier Bernal Diaz del Castillo state that Cortes grieved at
having had to destroy the two cities and kill so many in order to accomplish
his goals. But worse was still to come. For four days after victory had been achieved,
the Tlaxcallans and other indigenous allies of the Spaniards proceeded to
massacre a great number of the hapless survivors.[10] It would seem that Cortes
momentarily lost control of the situation at that time.
Cortes'
Mesoamerican political project was medieval in design. Although he and the rest
of the conquistadores always recognized the authority of Charles V, King of
Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, they wished to set up a feudal
system in "New Spain"--one in which the conquistadores and the native
elites would administer different territories and support themselves via the
extraction of tribute from the masses.
This
project did not imply any major changes as regards the pre-Conquest situation
and was therefore acceptable to many of the indigenous city-states. Cortes'
problem had to do with the Spanish Crown, for the latter had an alternative and
much more centralized project. However, during the first years after the defeat
of the Triple Alliance, it lacked sufficient power to be able to openly oppose
him.
Between
1521 and 1524, Cortes was able to go ahead with his plans. The
crown recognized him as Governor, Captain-General and Principal Judge of New
Spain, and authorized the granting of lands to the conquistadores in reward for
services rendered. Although the crown expressly forbade the practice of the
encomienda (whereby the Spaniards were entitled to exact labor from those
natives "commended" to their spiritual guidance), Cortes
disobeyed the order, arguing that the practice was indispensable for the
survival of his men.
In
December 1521, a representative of the crown arrived in New Spain in order to
supervise Cortes, but the latter was easily able to manipulate
him. However, in 1524, the crown sent other functionaries, supposedly to look
after the royal treasury. By then Cortes had tired of the
sedentary life he was leading. He also suspected betrayal on the part of one of
his subordinates, whom he had sent to conquer the Hiberas (present-day
Honduras), rumored to be rich in gold. So toward the end of 1524, Cortes
set off for this distant land.
The
expedition lasted almost two years and was a great disappointment owing to
various setbacks and the poverty of the region. During this time, several
Spaniards who were personal enemies of Cortes governed the Valley
of Mexico and neighboring areas. On returning to the valley in June 1526, the conquistador
re-established his control. The following month, however, a "resident
judge," Luis Ponce de Le6n, arrived in order to investigate a series of
charges against Cortes. The judge died shortly afterwards but was
replaced by the royal treasurer, Alonso de Estrada. Cortes was
now ordered to travel to Spain, as the crown wished to "consult" with
him about certain issues relating to its new possessions and reward him for all
his efforts in favor of the crown.
Cortes
arrived in Spain in March 1528. He was warmly received, and in 1529 the Emperor
Charles V granted him a large number of lands in Mesoamerica--almost all of
them located outside the Valley of Mexico--as well as various titles. However,
he was not allowed to resume the office of Governor.
Cortes
returned to New Spain in July 1530. He spent several years administering his
lands and later undertook a series of explorations in the Gulf of California.
When he returned, New Spain had been transformed into a viceroyalty under the
administration of Antonio de Mendoza. The viceroy proceeded to further limit Cortes'
political power, and so the latter once again sailed to Spain in order to
complain to the Emperor. But times had changed. He was forced to wait several
years before being granted a royal audience, and when he finally got to speak
with the Emperor he was treated with cold indifference. After further years of
unsuccessfully trying to gain recognition for what he considered to be his
legitimate rights, Cortes decided to return once again to New Spain.
However, he died near the city of Seville on December 2, 1547.
Cortes'
luck changed for the worse after 1524 and his virtu was insufficient to be able
to counteract its effects. He faced a rival--the Spanish Crown--more powerful
and cunning than him, one that steadily managed to implement its own political
project in those lands where the conquistador had at one time established a
personal hegemony.
As
we have seen, Cortes met with a series of failures throughout his
political life. His accomplishments were also many--otherwise, he would not
have achieved such renown. Of these, the most outstanding ones are considered
to be his defeat of the Aztec Empire and his conquest of the greater part of
northern Mesoamerica.
Were
these two accomplishments in fact so great? Consider the first of them. What
has been clearly demonstrated by several authors is that the expression
"Aztec Empire" is something of a misnomer.[11] There never was in
Mesoamerica a territorial empire like the ancient Roman one. The international
political system in which the "Aztecs"[12] found themselves was
structurally anarchic, that is, without an overarching authority. Within this
system several "Great Powers," such as Tenochtitlan, Texcoco,
Tlaxcallan and Tzintzuntzan, co-existed. Three important city-states in the
Valley of Mexico--Tenochtitlan, Texcoco and Tlacopan--became allies in 1428 in
order to oppose a common adversary. They went on to establish a collective
hegemony within the Valleys of Mexico, Morelos and Toluca, and to exert some
influence in the regions of Oaxaca, Totonacapan and Xoconochco. This enabled
them to obtain tribute and logistical support for their military campaigns,
which were very frequent because so many of their "vassals"
rebelled--even Tlatelolco, Tenochtitlan's island neighbor, rose up in arms
against the Triple Alliance in 1473.[13] The Triple Alliance's influence,
rested mainly on its psychological power, derived in turn from its military
strength. The members of this alliance--and especially Tenochtitlan--were
important entities. Nevertheless, the great majority of the other city-states
in northern Mesoamerica preserved all or most of their political autonomy.
It
should also be noted that the Triple Alliance faced internal difficulties at
the beginning of the sixteenth century. The succession to the throne of Texcoco
was disputed by three brothers in 1516-17, and this conflict provoked a de
facto division within that state. Also, relations between Tenochtitlan and
Texcoco were steadily deteriorating by then.[14]
Cortes
confronted a coalition of powerful states in the Valley of Mexico. However, the
control which this coalition exercised over different parts of northern
Mesoamerica was fragile and the conquistador obtained allies with relative
ease, given the indisputable military capacity of his small band of soldiers.
The political situation in Mesoamerica greatly favored Cortes.
As
regards the "conquest" of northern Mesoamerica--what many choose to
call the Conquest of Mexico--we should note the following. The defeat of the
Triple Alliance and the adherence of many city-states to Cortes during
the period 1519-22 did not imply major political changes (or even religious
ones--the spiritual conquest began in 1525 with the offensive of the Franciscan
friars in Texcoco).[15] Cortes recognized the legitimacy of the
Mesoamerican city-states and of the majority of their rulers. The
aristocracy--the pipiltin--was exempt from payment of tribute to the Spanish
Crown, and continued to receive tribute from the macehualtin, or commoners. The
crown, represented by Cortes and the other conquistadores, substituted
Tenochtitlan and other powerful city-states whose primacy had been recognized
by secondary states. But the influence exercised by the Spaniards during the
period in which Cortes governed New Spain (1521-24) was hegemonic
rather than imperial. In other words, the native city-states continued to enjoy
considerable political autonomy during this period, in spite of having become
subjects of the crown and in spite of the military capacity of the small band
of Spaniards that found itself in northern Mesoamerica. Once more Spaniards
arrived and the crown was able to consolidate its power in the region, this
political autonomy was reduced (although it never disappeared completely).
Perhaps one can speak of an authentic conquest--i.e., the establishment of an
empire--as of the second half of the sixteenth century. In any case, this was
achieved by other representatives of the Spanish Crown rather than by Cortes,
even though he initiated this political change.
In
short, Cortes had great diplomatic ability and was personally
brave. He was by no means a political or military "superman,"
however. Neither was he someone who consciously took major risks. The
conquistador certainly possessed those qualities which Machiavelli calls
virtu---but not in such a degree as to be able to control his fortuna, either
during or after the Conquest.
1This
is the title of a collection of essays edited by F. Gentles and M. Steinfield
on "historical myths and canons."
2Mesoamerica
is the name given to a cultural area that includes the southern half of Mexico
and the northern half of Central America.
3The
interested reader is referred to P. Savigear, "Nicco1o Machiavelli: The
Prince and the Discourses," in M.G. Forsyth and H.M.A. Keens-Soper, eds.,
A Guide to the Political Classics: Plato to Rousseau.
4A
few examples will suffice. In The Conquest of America (p. 116), Tzvetan Todorov
writes: "Cortes' behavior irresistibly suggests the almost contemporary
teachings of Machiavelli .... How can we avoid the comparison between Cortes'
stratagems and Machiavelli's precepts .... " Hugh Thomas, in Conquest (pp.
601-02) states in his coneluding chapter:
The
word which best expresses Cortes' actions is
"audacity": it contains a hint of imagination, impertinence, a
capacity to perform the unexpected which differentiates it from mere valour. Cortes
was also decisive, flexible, and had few scruples .... Cortes'
combination of intelligence and prudence, bravery and originality were decisive
in the extraordinary events in Mexico between 1519 and 1521.
Francis
MacNutt (Fernando Cortes and the Conquest of Mexico, p. 456)
observes that "...he exercised a masterful leadership in which he blended
astute elasticity with inflexible firmness. Bravery, constancy, and patience
are numbered among his virtues .... "
Jose
Luis Hernandez, in HernanCortes, includes quotations from
Machiavelli at the beginning of several chapters of his biography, implying
that the conquistador should be seen as a quintessential
"Machiavellian."
Cortes
was in Totonacapan from late April to early June of 1.519, and reached
Tenochtitlan in early November of that year.
PHOTOS
(BLACK & WHITE): Mexican money and Mexican stamps make generous use of
Indian motifs, but since the triumph of the first Spanish incursions, Mexican
society has been much less friendly to the culture of the indigenous peoples.
Almazan,
M.A. The Northern Mesoamerican StatesSystem, 1350-1524 A.D.: Structure and
Dynamics. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1994.
Berdan,
F. The Aztecs of Central Mexico: An Imperial Society. New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1982.
Clendinnen,
I. "'Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty': Cortes and the Conquest
of Mexico," in Representations Vol. 33 (University of California), Winter
1991: 65-100.
Cortes,
H. Five Letters of Cortes to the Emperor. New York: W.W. Norton
& Co., 1962.
Davies,
N. Los senorios independientes del imperio azteca. Mexico, D.F.: U.N.A.M.,
1968.
------.
The Aztecs: A History. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1973.
Diaz
del Castillo, B. The Conquest of New Spain. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1965.
Gentles,
F. and M. Steinfield. Hangups From Way Back: Historical Myths and Canons,
Vol.II. San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1970.
Hassig,
R. Trade, Tribute, and Transportation: The Sixteenth-Century Political Economy
of the Valley of Mexico, Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1985.
Hassig,
R. Mexico and the Spanish Conquest. New York: Longman, 1994.
Martinez,
Jose Luis. HernanCortes. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica,
1990.
MacNutt,
F.A. Fernando Cortes and the Conquest of Mexico. New York: G.P.
Putnam & Sons, 1940.
Savigear,
P. "Nicco1o Machiavelli: The Prince and the Discourses," in M.G.
Forsyth and H.M.A. Keens-Soper (eds.) A Guide to the Political Classics: Plato
to Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988.
Thomas,
H. Conquest: Montezuma, Cortes, and the Fall of Old Mexico. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
Todorov,
T. The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: Harper &
Row, 1984.
By
Marco A. Almazan
Marco
A. Almazan is Professor of International Relations and History at Universidad
de las Americas-Puebla. His current research interests are the comparative
study of states' systems and the history of international political thought.